Bombs and bomb threats are insidious weapons. They are being used by more people from broader backgrounds than ever before. The loss of life, property damage and pandemonium that occur are reaching unseen levels. As security professionals, we are in a position to influence the outcome of any incident in which a bomb is utilized or threatened. This is an important responsibility and we will be held accountable for poor performance if we fail.

The first key to success is in effectively planning our countermeasures.

The second key to success is in backing up our planning with the correct countermeasures.

Equipment purchases, architectural modifications, statistical studies, bomb threat modeling, procedural development, dogs, training, and deterrent systems are worthless if the planning is faulty or nonexistent. Because of the ease involved with simply buying a security product, proper planning and training are often overlooked. Dedicated bombers will find the weakness in poor planning and easily sidestep the resultant poor security measures.

The Five "P" Rule:

Proper Planning Prevents Poor Performance

Bomb countermeasure plans must be as encompassing as possible. If not, a dedicated bomber will simply change tactics to avoid or defeat countermeasures. The planner should not just plan against large vehicle bombs while ignoring the chance of a bomb being thrown through a window. Similarly, varying the routes and times an important executive takes to work are ineffective if no provisions have been made to properly screen the mail at the home of the executive. Protecting one facility while ignoring others will probably lead to an attack at the unprotected facility.

The first step in the planning process is to formulate a Bomb Threat Assessment (BTA). Bombs by their nature pose a unique threat. A threat assessment is broadly based and takes into account many issues. An assessment looking at bombs should look only at bombs. Training, access control, information security, executive protection, security personnel, architecture, and other areas of security need to be examined, but will take on a whole different light when looked at purely as related to bombs.

For instance, employee training during the BTA would be evaluated for relevance to the bomb problem as a whole. An X-ray operator who is well trained in looking for weapons at access control points may require additional training in order to spot bombs. Employees automatically picking up a brief case left in the lobby and turning it into "Lost and Found," could pose a problem if the facility is considering hardening itself for bombs. Other training issues which should be addressed during the BTA are such things as whether or not telephone operators know what they should do if they receive a bomb threat, or even if they have been told the possibility exists.

A standard threat assessment may recommend that grates be installed over first floor windows to prevent "smash and grab" or burglary. During the Bomb Threat Assessment it may be noted that although these grates prevent bombs from being thrown through the window, they may pose a liability by allowing a bomb to be easily affixed to the window, a fairly common method of attack. Film shielding or Lexon may be appropriate to alleviate the particular "smash and grab" problem in a way that does not increase the risk of a successful bomb attack. In another example, a standard threat assessment may indicate that an alarm be installed on the CEOs vehicle which sounds when a person attempts to open a door. If a proximity sensor has not been installed, than a bomb may be placed underneath the vehicle with impunity.

Leaving empty cardboard boxes next to a dumpster may pose very few problems from a loss control standpoint, but may allow a bomb to be easily concealed. Potted plants are a common decorative fixture in office lobbies, but if the pot is not "topped off" with plastic or gravel, they may prove to be a deadly liability.

The Bomb Threat Assessment should be performed at least quarterly or as needed in response to changing conditions. In some cases, a threat may be substantially reduced or eliminated, allowing resources to be reallocated. Likewise, a threat may increase dramatically, and the countermeasures called for may need to be increased quickly. Of course, day to day countermeasures should never be relaxed, nor is it normally recommended to downgrade from a posture of readiness, especially if financial resources are available.

Planning for bomb countermeasures must always remain flexible. Many situations change which warrant revisiting and modifying existing planning. Planning which isn't flexible will allow Murphy's Law to take effect and pandemonium to become the overriding factor in a crisis.

Bomb Threat Assessments may become complicated if an organization is operating nationally, or internationally. The threats will be almost completely different from region to region around the world. If personnel are traveling outside of the country or secured areas, than extreme countermeasures may apply during the period of travel. Travel in Algeria has a higher risk than traveling in Scotland and these differences should be addressed.

At the minimum the Bomb Threat Assessment should evaluate these broad headings:

1. Threats Received
    a. Credibility
    b. How They Were Communicated

2. Threats Perceived
    a. Who might want to target my facility?
    b. What facilities are located in proximity to mine and
        how will an attack on them affect my operation?

3. VIP Individuals Who Are at Risk
    a. Family Concerns

4. Groups with Opposing Philosophies
    a. Business Competitors
    b. Possibility of Terrorism

5. State of Vehicles
    a. Response
    b. VIP Transportation

6. Countermeasures in Place

7. Equipment Assets
    a. Detection Equipment, such as X-Ray, etc.
    b. Search Equipment, such as Body Armor, Lights, etc.
    c. Communications

8. Personnel Assets
    a. Up-To-Date and Comprehensive Training
    b. Refresher Training
    c. Number Available for Incident Response

9. Architectural Strengths and Weaknesses

10. Perimeter Access Control

11. Mail and Delivery Security

12. Exterior of Facility Buildings

13. Condition of Perimeter Lighting

14. Parking Control

15. CCTV Coverage

16. Alarm and Duress Systems

17. Housekeeping
     a. Cleanliness
     b. Landscaping

The Bomb Threat Assessment is an ongoing process. Like most risk management principles, it must become part of everyday business practice if it is to be an effective cornerstone of a facility's protection.

The next logical step is to use the information which we have gained to begin to develop a plan to counter explosive attacks. In most cases, this plan is known as a Bomb Incident Plan (BIP). In older terminology the BIP was referred to as a bomb threat plan. The BIP may be a part of crisis management or occupant emergency plans. Whatever the terminology, the end result is the same. A solid plan to reduce our liabilities.

The BIP is your best defense should an incident occur and you wind up in court.

When writing a BIP you will have to start by developing a shell, or outline, based on the BTA. Format is unimportant as long as it is clear, concise and easy to use.

This shell will be filled in as you address the issues which you have already isolated during the BTA and the issues which you will encounter as you begin to write the BIP. The BIP should encompass the problems identified by the BTA as well as the procedures to be utilized in order to eliminate, decrease or respond to the specific scenarios posed by the BTA.

Writing the BIP is one of the best ways to actually plan. For instance, the means or avenue for communication will be an important part of the BIP. It may occur to you while you are writing the phone tree for notification of an event, that the CEO is normally not in town. Therefore, you may want three alternates, instead of the standard two.

When writing the BIP, be aware that is easy to write yourself into a corner. A common example of this is when an organization is writing standard operating procedures (SOPs) for search teams. The old way to do this was to write something to the effect of:

Teams will search the room by dividing it into the following areas by height:

1. Floor to waist level.
2. Waist to head level.
3. Head to ceiling.
4. Other areas.

This worked back in the dark ages before effectiveness (and therefore, liability) was an issue to most of us. In today's world it locks the personnel performing the search into a poorly designed SOP with no room to deviate. For instance if you are searching outside on the buildings perimeter, how are you going to search to the level of the ceiling. Overly restrictive SOPs may be picked apart by a plaintiffs attorney. Therefore, your SOPs may be worthless to you as a point of defense in court. This is because it will not be difficult for the plaintiffs to show that you did not think the SOPs through and you put your employees into harms way without prudence.

A lot of information and thought needs to go into the BIP. As isolated in the BTA, the BIP must delineate measures, countermeasures, and supplementary information to be used in the event of a threat or incident. The BIP must cover almost every foreseeable circumstance relating to bombs and how they will be handled by the organization from threat evaluation to searching to public relations. You may want to incorporate the BIP into other emergency plans, such as crisis management.

The BIP should clearly delineate all responsibilities for handling threats and response, developing procedures, purchasing and installing equipment, personnel training, and timetables for getting things done, etc. It should encompass all levels of the organization. Training should be thoroughly documented, both in the BIP and individual employee records.

A properly designed Bomb Incident Plan takes into account the "nuts and bolts" before, during, and after an incident occurs. The primary focus is on preventing an attack in the first place. The secondary focus is minimizing the effects of an attack or threat, should one take place. Lastly, it is critical to recover as soon as possible, and recovery procedures and potential resources should also be addressed as part of the BIP.

The six most common mistakes in developing
and carrying out a BIP are:

1. The planner is unfamiliar with explosive attacks;
2. The plan developed does not take human nature into account or is too restrictive;
3. No commitment to training is made by management;
4. No commitment is made to procure and use the correct equipment and tools to back up the front line personnel;
5. Instead of effectively using existing documents to the fullest extent possible, the planner attempts to "reinvent the wheel;"
6. The plan is shelved next to a dozen other plans.

A planner should take into account the "what if's." Notes taken during the BTA will be invaluable, because it can be assumed a bomber will have similar notes (or ideas). A good bomb countermeasures planner will assume the mind set of the bomber, and think along the lines of how to penetrate the facilities security. What would be the most effective attack? Sending a bomb in the mail, planting one at the front door, in the parking lot? Giving a trendy and expensive bobby trapped pen to the CEO? Drive a car laden with explosives up to the front of the building?

After considering possible attacks, the planner has to decide numerous ways to stop probable styles of attack. Each must be documented, and the planner needs to find equipment that may assist, isolate training requirements, formulate budgetary requirements, and begin to fill in the BIP shell with draft procedures.

Security personnel should never exclude management from the planning process. Additionally, including such specialities as facility management early on in the process will reduce the likelihood of small details being overlooked, such as providing keys and blueprints to police assisting in bomb searches.

Legal counsel may be sought when planning for some contingencies. The rule of thumb is that counsel should always be sought when making any decision which may put protection of property over protection of life. For example, leaving a guard behind in an evacuation to secure a painting may be a good idea to protect the painting, but that guard may lose his or her life if a bomb explodes. Part of the BIP should deal with evacuation. One of the most common mistakes made by planners is to utilize fire alarms to evacuate personnel from buildings. Planners should never utilize fire evacuation plans for bomb threat evacuations. Fire alarms have people leaving from all directions and may contact the fire department automatically. This increases the odds of having personnel channeled and brings emergency crews directly into harms way. If the evacuation is caused by a hoax, prematurely notifying the fire department takes valuable resources from other community emergencies. If a public announcement (PA) system is available, a code should be announced so personnel can make an orderly, safe evacuation and assist in the search by removing personal belongings and securing select noisy equipment such as computers. If no PA system is available, a telephone "call down list" with primary and alternate contact information should be utilized.

Many sources recommend evacuating personnel to 300 feet of the suspected item. I recommend a minimum of 1000 feet when possible. Nine hundred feet is the minimum safe distance for people in the open for a detonation of up to twenty-seven pounds of exposed non-fragmenting high explosive. Fragmentation can be projected much farther from the blast seat. Of course, in some situations this distance may not be practical to implement and may be adjusted as warranted.

Some elements of the BIP should be kept confidential. Personnel contact information, threat evaluation criteria, and other documentation must be safeguarded. However, certain portions of the BIP need to be disseminated among all persons who need the information. For example, a memo disseminating a coded evacuation and how to leave will need to be given to all employees. Another example would be the posting of procedures which an X-ray operator uses during daily work.

Part of the purpose of the BIP is to outline a time table for accomplishing tasks, such as performing personnel training, building a safe holding area (if used) for suspect mail, ensuring each person with an outside line has a tailored bomb threat checklist under the telephone, etc.

Safety concerns should be emphasized throughout the planning process. Regardless of personal experience level, bombs or packages which have been designated suspicious should never be disturbed unless it is done by public safety personnel qualified to disarm bombs. Never attempt to approach, examine, poke, prod, shake, squeeze, open, drop or mishandle suspect packages in any way.

Through proper planning, training and thoughtful equipment purchases the problem of the bomb can be reduced to a manageable risk. It is far better to know what to do before an incident occurs.

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Edward J. Seuter, president of Explosive Countermeasures International, Inc. is an Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technician, a nationally registered EMT, a licensed blaster, a naval trained diver, and a Virginia Certified Private Security Instructor. He can best be described as a Countermeasures Specialist.

Mr. Seuter is an active member of the American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS), the International Association of Bomb Technicians and Investigators (IABTI), the International Society of Explosive Engineers (SEE), and the Professional Investigators Security Association (PISA).